











































An investigation of the validity of the Edinburgh Social Cognition
Test (ESCoT) in acquired brain injury (ABI)
Citation for published version:
Poveda, B, Abrahams, S, Baksh, RA, MacPherson, SE & Evans, J 2021, 'An investigation of the validity of
the Edinburgh Social Cognition Test (ESCoT) in acquired brain injury (ABI)', Journal of the International
Neuropsychological Society. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1355617721001223
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1017/S1355617721001223
Link:




Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society
Publisher Rights Statement:
This article has been published in a revised form in Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1355617721001223. This version is published under a Creative Commons CC-BY-NC-
ND. No commercial re-distribution or re-use allowed. Derivative works cannot be distributed. © INS.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 22. Dec. 2021






An Investigation of the Validity of the Edinburgh Social Cognition Test (ESCoT) in Acquired 
Brain Injury (ABI) 
 
Blanca Poveda*1, Sharon Abrahams2, R. Asaad Baksh3,4, Sarah E. MacPherson2  
& Jonathan J. Evans5 
 
 
1Department of Clinical Neurosciences, NHS Lothian, Edinburgh, United Kingdom 
2Department of Psychology, School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh, 
Edinburgh, United Kingdom 
3Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology, and Neuroscience, Department of Forensic and Neurodevelopmental 
Sciences, King’s College London, London, United Kingdom 
4The London Down Syndrome (LonDownS) Consortium, London, United Kingdom 
5Institute of Health and Wellbeing, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, United Kingdom  
 
*Department of Clinical Neurosciences (DCN) 
NHS Lothian, 
Royal Infirmary of Edinburgh, 
Edinburgh, EH16 4TJ 
United Kingdom  
Tel. +44 0131 312 0649 
Email blanca.poveda@nhslothian.scot.nhs.uk 
Word Count for Manuscript: 6218 words 
Word Count for Abstract: 247 words  




Objectives: Social cognition is frequently impaired following an acquired brain injury (ABI) 
but often overlooked in clinical assessments. There are few validated and appropriate measures 
of social cognitive abilities for ABI patients. The current study examined the validity of the 
Edinburgh Social Cognition Test (ESCoT, Baksh et al., 2018) in measuring social cognition 
following an ABI. Method: Forty-one patients with ABI were recruited from a rehabilitation 
service and completed measures of general ability, executive functions and social cognition 
(Faux Pas; FP, Reading the Mind in the Eyes; RME, Social Norms Questionnaire; SNQ and 
the ESCoT). Forty-one controls matched on age, sex and years of education also performed the 
RME, SNQ and ESCoT. Results: A diagnosis of ABI was significantly associated with poorer 
performance on all ESCoT measures and RME while adjusting for age, sex and years of 
education. In ABI patients, the ESCoT showed good internal consistency with its 
subcomponents and performance correlated with the other measures of social cognition 
demonstrating convergent validity. Better Trail Making Test performance predicted better 
ESCoT total, RME and SNQ scores. Higher TOPF IQ was associated with higher RME scores, 
while higher WAIS-IV working memory predicted better FP performance. Conclusion: The 
ESCoT is a brief, valid and internally consistent assessment tool able to detect social cognition 
deficits in neurological patients. Given the prevalence of social cognition deficits in ABI and 
the marked impact these can have on an individual’s recovery, this assessment can be a helpful 
addition to a comprehensive neuropsychological assessment.  
 
Keywords: acquired brain injury, social cognition, theory of mind, social norm understanding, 
executive function, assessment. 
  





Social cognitive abilities are higher order cognitive processes that include emotion 
recognition, the ability to infer the beliefs, thoughts, and intentions of others (i.e., cognitive 
theory of mind, ToM), the ability to make inferences about the feelings of others (i.e., affective 
ToM), and the understanding of social norms or rules, moral judgement, and empathy (Baez et 
al., 2013). These abilities can often be impaired following an acquired brain injury (ABI) and 
may compromise a person’s ability to make social judgements, infer and understand other 
people’s feelings, and communicate effectively with others (McDonald, 2013; Levin, 1995; 
Morton & Wehman, 1995). Social cognitive difficulties can therefore have severe psychosocial 
consequences including a negative impact on the ability to work towards rehabilitation goals, 
to return to or maintain work, or maintain meaningful social relationships (Ownsworth & 
McKenna, 2004).  
 
Despite these negative consequences, social cognition in ABI is rarely assessed in day-
to-day clinical practice (Kelly, McDonald & Frith, 2017). In a survey of 443 clinicians treating 
individuals with brain injury, 84% stated that more than half their patients had deficits in social 
communication and 78% of these reported not having tools or time to fully assess or treat social 
communication (Kelly et al., 2017). Part of the difficulty is that few social cognition tests have 
been developed or validated in ABI populations, or may not be available for purchase or 
adoption (Sohlberg et al., 2019). In addition, many such assessments can be particularly 
lengthy and may focus on one sole aspect of social cognition. This can be a challenge for busy 
clinicians with limited time who wish to get an overall idea of their client’s social cognitive 
ability. Assessment tools for social cognition have often been developed for research into 
autism spectrum disorders (Baron-Cohen, O’Riordan, Stone, Jones & Plaisted, 1999). 
Commonly used social cognition tests, such as the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RME, 
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Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, 
Raste, & Plumb, 2001) and the Faux-Pas Test (Stone, Baron-Cohen and Knight, 1998), among 
others, have often been used experimentally to distinguish individuals with and without autism.  
For example, the RME aims to assess an individual’s ability to infer other people’s mental 
states by visually examining photos of the eye region and requesting the participant to label the 
emotional state. The revised version of the RME (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) aimed to improve 
the psychometric properties of the original RME and was shown to be able to distinguish 
between severe TBI and controls’ performance (Henry, Phillips, Crawford, Ietswaart, & 
Summers, 2006). However, this test provides little in terms of contextual information or cues 
and assumes participants are able to infer emotional states by looking at the eye region alone. 
On the other hand, the Faux Pas test (Stone et al., 1998) uses story vignettes as well as a set of 
predetermined questions to evaluate an individual’s ability to understand a faux pas (i.e., an 
unintentional statement that the listener might not want to hear or know, and which can have 
unintended negative consequences). Research has shown that individuals with a TBI or 
bilateral damage to the orbitofrontal cortex appear more impaired than those with damage to 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex or controls in their ability to detect a faux pas (Milders, Fuchs, 
& Crawford, 2003; Stone et al., 1998) or correctly rejecting a non faux-pas (Milders, Ietswaart, 
Crawford, & Currie, 2006).  
 
One assessment that aims to provide a generic social cognition profile in neurological 
disorders by incorporating elements of other well-known social cognition tasks is the Geneva 
Social Cognition Scale (GeSoc; Martory et al., 2015). The GeSoc is a screening tool that 
includes sections of ToM and emotion recognition tasks from the Faux Pas (Stone et al., 1998) 
and Reading the Mind in the Eyes (RME; Baron-Cohen, et al., 2001) tests, and has 62% 
sensitivity and 94% specificity for a cut-off of 84 in detecting social cognition deficits in 
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patients with neurological disorders (Martory et al, 2015). While the GeSoc is likely to have 
high convergent validity given that it includes items from the Faux Pas and RME, the tool has 
not been validated against other social cognition assessments. 
 
In terms of ecological validity, the Awareness of Social Inference Test (TASIT; 
McDonald, Flanagan, Rollins, & Kinch, 2003) assesses emotion recognition, ToM and the 
capacity to understand the meaning of spoken comments intended non-literally and the ability 
to distinguish between these and literally intended comments. Participants are tasked with 
identifying speaker beliefs, intentions and pragmatic inferences contrasting sincere exchanges 
with sarcasm and lies from video-vignettes with actors. The TASIT aims to provide the 
assessor with an overview of an individual’s social cognition by measuring a range of abilities 
using stimuli involving everyday interactions. The TASIT is valid and reliable in the 
assessment of certain aspects of social cognition in severe traumatic brain injury (TBI; 
McDonald et al., 2006). The TASIT comprises three subtests and normative data are currently 
available for older children and adults (14-60 years) (McDonald, Flanagan, & Rollins, 2011).  
A limitation of the TASIT, however, is its administration time which is often not possible in 
public healthcare settings.  
 
Other social cognition tests in ABI have focused on specific aspects of social cognition 
such as ToM. Patients with severe TBI are impaired on ToM assessed using stories and static 
pictures (Milders et al., 2003; Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, Berger, & Aharon-Peretz, 2003). 
However, while experimental studies tend to distinguish between affective and cognitive ToM 
(Shamay-Tsoory, Tibi-Elhanany & Aharon-Peretz, 2006), few clinical measures have been 
developed and validated in ABI that tap both affective and cognitive ToM within the same test 
(Henry, Cowan, Lee & Sachdev, 2015). According to Henry et al. (2015), the Faux Pas (Stone, 
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Baron-Cohen & Knight, 1998) and the Strange Stories task (Happé, 1994) tap both affective 
and cognitive ToM. Tests such as the RME (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), Ekman-60 (Young, 
Perrett, Calder, Sprengelmeyer & Ekman, 2002), Emotion Evaluation Test  from the TASIT 
(McDonald, Flanagan, Rollins & Kinch, 2003) and Florida Affect Battery (Bowers, Blonder & 
Heilman, 1999) are primarily affective ToM measures whilst the False-Belief Task (Gregory 
et al., 2002) would mainly tap cognitive ToM.  
 
Another aspect of social cognition that has not typically been assessed in ABI is the 
ability to understand social rules from interpersonal (how another person should behave) and 
intrapersonal (how they themselves should be behave) viewpoints. While the understanding of 
social norms has been explored in healthy aging (Halberstadt, Ruffman, Murray, Taumoepeau, 
& Ryan, 2011; Baksh, Abrahams, Auyeung & MacPherson, 2018; Baksh, Bugeja, & 
MacPherson, 2020a), autistic adults (Baez et al., 2012; Baksh et al., 2020b) and patients with 
schizophrenia and bipolar disorder (Baez et al., 2013), few studies have examined social norm 
understanding in ABI. Beer and colleagues (2006) found that patients with orbitofrontal 
damage due to trauma still had knowledge of social norms but could not apply them in social 
situations.  
 
IQ and/or executive functions (Ozonoff & McEvoy, 1994; Sabbagh, Xu, Carlson, 
Moses, & Lee, 2006; see MacPherson & Della Sala, 2015) can also be compromised in ABI, 
which can complicate social cognition assessment. In particular, ToM and executive functions 
have been reported to be strongly associated (Bora et al., 2005; Channon & Crawford, 2000; 
Charlton, Barrick, Markus, & Morris, 2009). Apperly, Samson, and Humphreys (2005) argue 
that, due to common mechanisms, executive deficits may at least partially underlie deficits in 
ToM. However, there are single case studies involving ABI patients that have demonstrated a 
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dissociation between ToM and executive functions (Bird, Castelli, Malik, Frith, & Husain, 
2004; Lough, Gregory, & Hodges, 2001). The debate regarding the associations between social 
cognition and executive abilities remains unresolved. Nonetheless, in ABI patients who may 
exhibit executive impairments, it is essential that the social cognition measures used show 
minimal associations with executive functions to accurately capture social cognitive abilities 
and identify difficulties, to then target rehabilitation.  
 
It is common to use different tests to examine distinct aspects of social cognition. 
However, this makes direct comparisons problematic for clinical settings, since these different 
tests may vary in difficulty. Some variability in the results discussed above are due to the 
diversity of tasks used to assess ToM, as different tasks have been found to utilise different 
cognitive mechanisms (Ahmed & Miller, 2011). The Edinburgh Social Cognition Test 
(ESCoT; Baksh et al., 2018) was devised to allow clinicians and researchers to examine 
different aspects of social cognition within the same test. The ESCoT has been validated in 
healthy adults aged 18-85 years (Baksh et al., 2018) and autistic adults (Baksh et al., 2020b). 
ESCoT performance has also been found to dissociate from IQ measures (Baksh et al., 2018) 
or executive functions such as set shifting, inhibition and updating in healthy adults (Baksh et 
al., 2020a) and autistic adults (Baksh et al., 2020b). However, the ESCoT has not been 
validated in patients with ABI. 
 
Current Study  
Given that social cognition impairments are common following ABI, but are not 
typically assessed, the ESCoT would provide clinicians with a clinical tool that examines 
distinct aspects of social cognition within the same test. The current study aimed to examine 
the validity of the ESCoT in people with ABI by assessing the correlation between performance 
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on the ESCoT and performance on other well-established social cognition assessments (i.e., 
Faux Pas test, Reading the Mind in the Eyes and the Social Norms Questionnaire). In addition, 
we assessed whether the ESCoT was better able to distinguish between the ABI and control 
groups than existing social cognition measures. The final aim was to evaluate the psychometric 
properties of the ESCoT in ABI and compare these to traditional social cognition tests by 





Patients with first incidence ABI were recruited during their inpatient stay as part of a 
clinical rehabilitation service at the Neurorehabilitation Hospital at the Astley Ainslie Hospital 
in Edinburgh, UK. Exclusion criteria were: 1) a prior neurological or psychiatric history; 2) 
neurodegenerative condition, learning or neurodevelopmental disability; 3) registered blind or 
deaf; and 4) non-native English speaker. Forty-one patients were recruited (27 males) aged 20-
72 years (M = 55.97, SD =11.30) with 10-20 years of full-time education (M = 12.78, SD = 
2.68). According to the Office for National Statistics (2010), our sample included 14 (34.1%) 
professionals, 3 (7.3%) intermediate workers, 11 (26.8 %) skilled workers, 7 (17.1%) semi-
skilled workers, and 6 (14.6 %) unskilled workers prior to their ABI. Diagnoses included 
cerebrovascular accident (CVA, N=20), traumatic brain injury (TBI, N=12), hypoxic brain 
injury (HBI, N=4), brain tumour (BT, N=3) and inflammatory brain injury (IBI, N=2). For the 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983), based on the 
proposed cut-off of 10 out of 21 (Crawford, Henry, Crombie, & Taylor, 2001), four patients 
fell within the clinical range for both anxiety and depression (3 CVA and 1 TBI), whilst another 
patient scored highly for depression alone (CVA) and another for anxiety alone (HBI). 
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According to Cohen (1992), a sample size of 67 with power = 0.80 and  = 0.05 was required 
to detect a medium effect size (correlation of r = .30) and a sample size of 23 with power = 
0.80 and  = 0.05 was required to detect a large effect size (correlation of r = .50) for 
correlations between the ESCoT and the other traditional measures of social cognition.  
Forty-one healthy controls (25 males) aged 20-72 years (M = 55.37, SD = 20.37) also 
took part. They had 9-20 years of full-time education (M = 13.49, SD = 2.49). Controls were 
recruited through online advertisement and a research volunteer panel at the University of 
Edinburgh. No control had a self-reported history of neurological or psychiatric disorders based 
on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-IV (WAIS-IV; Wechsler, 2008) exclusion criteria. 
The control group did not significantly differ from the ABI group in terms of age (p = 0.59), 
full-time education (p = 0.11) or gender (p = 0.82). 
The study was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki Ethical 
Principles and Good Clinical Practices and was approved by the local NHS Research Ethics 
Committee (18/NE/0067) and the School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences 




Test of Premorbid Functioning (TOPF; Wechsler, 2011). The TOPF was 
administered to estimate premorbid IQ. It is composed of 70 words that have atypical grapheme 
to phoneme translations. The TOPF is co-normed with the WAIS-IV (Wechsler, 2008) and has 
very high reliability (.96-.99), test-retest reliability (.89-.95) and concurrent validity with the 
WAIS-IV Full Scale IQ (r = .70, Holdnack & Whipple Drozdick, 2009).  
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General Cognitive Ability 
Repeatable Battery for the Assessment of Neuropsychological Status (RBANS-A, 
Randolph, 2009). The RBANS-A was used as a multi-domain screening measure. An 
aggregate measure of overall performance was computed to provide a Total Index score out of 
160. The clinical utility of the RBANS in TBI has been demonstrated with sensitivity and 
likelihood ratios from modest to strong, as well as high specificity (McKay, Casey, Wetheimer 
& Fichtenberg, 2007). Both construct validity (Pachet, 2007) and internal reliability (McKay 
et al., 2007) have been reported, supporting the use of the RBANS as a clinically valid tool for 
screening mild to severe TBI.  
  
Executive Abilities  
Verbal Fluency Test (Delis Kaplan Executive Functioning Scale, D-KEFS; Delis, 
Kaplan & Kramer, 2001). The D-KEFS Verbal Fluency Test was administered to assess 
cognitive flexibility. The examinee is given 60 seconds to generate as many unique words as 
possible starting with a particular letter (condition 1) and within a certain category (condition 
2). The total raw scores for each condition were considered separately. Frontal patients have 
more difficulty on the letter fluency task relative to the category fluency task, whereas patients 
with early Alzheimer’s disease often show the opposite pattern due to a breakdown in 
semantic knowledge (Delis et al., 2001). Test re-test reliability has been established for the 
letter and category conditions with coefficients ranging between .36 and .80. The letter fluency 
condition yielded the highest internal consistency coefficients, which ranged from moderate to 
high, with most age groups at the good to high levels. Internal consistencies are lower for 
category fluency (Delis et al., 2001).  
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Trail Making Test (D-KEFS; Delis et al., 2001). The Number-Letter Switching 
condition from the D-KEFS Trail Making Test (TMT) was also administered to assess 
cognitive flexibility. The examinee is presented with number and letter targets distributed 
across the page and is asked to switch back and forth between connecting numbers and letters 
in numerical and alphabetical order (i.e., 1, A, 2, B, etc.). When an error is made by the 
examinee, they are instructed to return to the last correct target before continuing. The D-KEFS 
TMT is scored in terms of completion time in seconds. Test re-test reliability coefficients for 
TMT ranged between .38 and .77, with internal consistency ranging between .69 and .81 (Delis 
et al., 2001).  
 
Working Memory Index (WMI) from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale - 
Fourth Edition (WAIS-IV; Wechsler, 2008). To assess working memory, two subtests from 
the WAIS-IV were administered: Arithmetic and Digit Span. For Arithmetic, the examinee is 
verbally presented with arithmetical problems that increase in difficulty. For Digit Span, the 
examinee is verbally presented with a string of numbers and is asked to repeat back the numbers 
in the same (Forward), reverse (Backward) or sequential (Sequencing) order immediately after 
stimuli presentation. A Working Memory Index (WMI) was calculated by combining the 
Arithmetic and Digit Span scores.  Reliability and validity of the WAIS-IV has been 
established with index reliability coefficients ranging from .90 to .98 and test-retest reliability 
coefficients ranging from .87 to .96 (Wechsler, 2008). 
 
Theory of Mind (ToM) 
Faux Pas Test (Stone et al., 1998). The Faux Pas (FP) test is an advanced ToM task 
based on the ability to recognise whether a faux pas has been committed or not (i.e.,  a character 
unintentionally says something they should not have said which could hurt or upset the other 
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character). The stories are read aloud and at the end of each story, the participant is asked 
questions about detecting a faux pas, understanding a faux pas, understanding the mental state 
of the receiver of the faux pas, understanding the mental state of the person producing the faux 
pas; and understanding the details of the story. One point was assigned for each correct 
response and a ratio score (0-1) was calculated according to Stone et al. (1998) where the higher 
the score, the better the performance. The FP test has been administered to autistic individuals 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1999) and adults with behavioural-variant frontotemporal dementia 
(bvFTD; Gregory et al., 2002). Baron-Cohen et al. (1997) showed the FP test was a good 
measure of ToM deficits in children with Asperger’s syndrome. In addition, Stone et al. (1998) 
investigated ToM in individuals with damage to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, orbitofrontal 
cortex (OFC) and anterior temporal cortex. They showed that individuals with damage to the 
OFC were able to understand the FP stories, yet were unable to state that something 
inappropriate had been said and concluded that the performance of OFC patients was parallel 
to that of Asperger’s syndrome.  Gregory et al. (2002) showed excellent inter-rater reliability 
(r=0.98) in ratings of patients with bvFTD and Alzheimer’s disease  
 
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RME; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). The RME 
assesses an individual’s understanding of other people’s mental states. Participants are shown 
37 (1 practice) photographs of the eye-region of the faces of different actors and given the 
choice of four adjectives to describe the emotion or internal state the actor is thinking or feeling. 
The total score is out of 36. Vellante et al. (2013) stated that the Italian version of the RME 
showed good internal consistency as well as good test-retest reliability. However, a review by 
Olderbak et al. (2015) suggested that the RME typically had poor internal consistency, though 
acceptable test-retest reliability. Spreng, McKinnon, Mar and Levine (2009) found no 
correlation between performance on the RME and the Interpersonal Perception Task–15 
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(Costanzo & Archer, 1994), a measure of nonverbal cue understanding in social interactions. 
Individuals with bvFTD are also impaired on the RME compared to controls (Gregory et al., 
2002). 
 
The Edinburgh Social Cognition Test (ESCoT, Baksh et al., 2018).1 The ESCoT 
measures four social cognitive abilities within the same test: affective ToM; cognitive ToM; 
interpersonal understanding of social norms and intrapersonal understanding of social norms. 
It consists of 11 self-contained dynamic, cartoon-style everyday social interactions: 1 practice 
interaction, 5 interactions involving a social norm violation and 5 not involving a social norm 
violation. Following a video presentation, the participant is presented with four cartoon picture 
frames in sequential order depicting what the video has just shown. Firstly, the participant is 
asked to describe what occurred in the interaction to ensure they understand the animation (this 
was not scored). Then, they are asked four questions about what they have just observed. Each 
question is awarded a maximum of three points based on the quality of the answer, resulting in 
a score of 12 points for each social interaction. The total maximum score for the test is 120 
points. The ESCoT takes about 20 minutes to administer and has been validated in healthy 
younger, middle-aged and older adults (Baksh et al., 2018) and autistic adults (Baksh et al., 
2020b). Our previous work has established the reliability of the ESCoT using intraclass 
correlation (ICCs), demonstrating a consistency of 0.90, indicating high inter-rater reliability. 
We have also assessed internal consistency for the ESCoT by calculating Guttman’s Lambda 
4 reliability which produced a coefficient of 0.70, which is acceptable (Baksh et al., 2018). 
Baksh et al. (2020b) developed cut-off scores for the ESCoT based on the 5th percentile of their 
normative data: total score  83; affective ToM  19; cognitive ToM  17; interpersonal social 
norms  18; and intrapersonal social norms  22. 
                                               
1 Copies of this assessment can be obtained by emailing the author AB. 




Social norm understanding 
Social Norms Questionnaire (SNQ; Rankin, 2008). The SNQ is a 22-item 
questionnaire that screens for potential behaviour changes and assesses how well individuals 
understand the social standards that govern their behaviour in UK mainstream culture. For 
example, “would it be socially acceptable to hug a stranger without asking them first?” A total 
score is obtained by summing the correct items (out of 22). A higher total score indicates 
greater knowledge of social norms. This measure is yet to be validated. 
 
Procedure 
Patients were tested individually over the course of two sessions during their inpatient 
stay. They performed the assessments in the following order: TOPF, RBANS-A, WAIS-IV, 
FP, RME, ESCoT, D-KEFS verbal fluency, D-KEFS TMT, and SNQ. Controls only performed 
the RME, ESCoT and SNQ. 
 
Analyses 
Firstly, we fitted multiple linear regression models to examine whether a diagnosis of 
ABI (i.e., ABI vs. not ABI) predicted performance on the ESCoT subtests, RME and SNQ, 
while adjusting for the impact of age, sex and years of education. We transformed scores on 
the social cognition tests using a square-root transformation to avoid violation of normality and 
results were back transformed by squaring the number. The reference group in the regression 
models were male for sex and the healthy controls for diagnostic group. Receiver Operator 
Characteristic (ROC) curve analyses were then conducted for the social cognition tests with 
both ABI and control data (ESCoT, RME and SNQ) to investigate the discriminant abilities of 
the social cognition tests to correctly assign participants to their diagnostic group. The control 
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data were from a retrospective data set which had data from the RME and SNQ only. We 
reported Area under the curve (AUC) for our ROC curve analysis as a measure of diagnostic 
accuracy. Cronbach’s  was used to establish the internal consistency of each of the subtests 
of the ESCoT in an ABI population. Kline’s (1999) cut-off of .70 was adopted as the minimum 
acceptable level of internal consistency.  
 
Pearson’s or Spearman’s correlational analyses were carried out on the ABI data 
depending on whether they were normally distributed or not to examine the relationship 
between the ESCoT, general cognitive ability and executive functioning measures and the 
established social cognition tests. Finally, the relationship between performance on social 
cognition tests and the general cognitive ability and executive measures were examined using 
an exploratory regression analysis. In the first stage, the background predictors (age, sex, SES, 
years of education, HADS-D and HADS-A) which significantly correlated with the outcome 
variables (ESCoT total score, RME, RMF and SNQ) at a pre-specified significance level of p 
< 0.20 were entered into the analysis (Altman, 1991) using the enter method. We chose a 
significance level of p < 0.20 over more traditional levels since p < 0.05 can fail in identifying 
variables known to be important to the outcome variable and simulation studies have shown 
that a cut-off of p < 0.20 yields better outcomes (Bursac et al., 2008; Lee, 2014). TOPF IQ 
scores were included in the first stage of the regression analysis if scores correlated with the 
outcome variables at p < 0.20. In the second stage, the general cognitive ability and executive 
measures were entered using the stepwise method (entry criterion p < 0.05, removal criterion p 
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Background neuropsychological measures  
Table 1 shows ABI performance on the premorbid ability, general cognitive ability, and 
executive measures. Figure 1 demonstrates the percentage of ABI patients who were impaired 
on those assessments.  
 
- Insert Table 1 and Figure 1 around here -  
 
Group comparisons between ABI patients and controls on ESCoT and established social 
cognition tests  
Table 2 demonstrates the performance of ABI patients and controls on the ESCoT and 
other social cognition measures. All patients were able to describe what occurred in the 
interactions suggesting that they understood the animations. 
 
- Insert Table 2 around here -  
 
The regression analyses examining whether a diagnosis of ABI predicted performance 
on the social cognition tests are presented in Table 3.  
 
- Insert Table 3 around here -  
 
We found that an ABI diagnosis was significantly associated with poorer performance 
on all four ESCoT subtests compared to controls even after adjusting for age, sex and years of 
education. Similarly, poorer performance on ESCoT total score and the RME were 
significantly associated with an ABI diagnosis. There was no statistically significant 
association between diagnostic group and SNQ performance. 




- Insert Figure 2 around here -  
 
In the Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC) curve analyses, the AUC values and 
95% confidence intervals were: ESCoT total score = 97.2 (92.5-100.0); RME = 81.1 (71.8-
90.4); and SNQ = 59.6 (47.1-72.0). Therefore, the ESCoT is the most effective at distinguishing 
between the ABI and control groups. The ESCoT total score showed high sensitivity and good 
specificity (95%, 88% respectively) at detecting ABI using the established cut-off score of 83 
or less. 
 
-Insert Table 4 around here- 
 
Based on Baksh et al. (2020), 5th percentile cut-off scores which were derived from 236 
healthy adults between the ages of 18 and 85, 58.54% of our ABI patients were impaired on 
the affective ToM subtest, 75.61% on the cognitive ToM subtest, 87.80% on interpersonal 
understanding of social norms, and 92.68% on intrapersonal understanding of social norms. In 
comparison, 12.20% of controls were impaired on the affective ToM subtest, 9.76% on the 
cognitive ToM subtest, 17.07% on interpersonal and 2.44% on intrapersonal understanding of 
social norms. On the total ESCoT score, 95.12% of ABI participants were impaired in 
comparison to 12.20% of controls (see Table 4). In Table 5, we also provide the patients’ 
ESCoT scores based on their diagnosis.  
.  
-Insert Table 5 around here- 
 
Internal consistency of ESCoT subtest items 
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Cronbach’s  for the 10 affective ToM items was .80. No subtest items were greater 
than the overall  level. Cronbach’s  for the 10 cognitive ToM items was .70. Similarly, no 
subtest items were greater than the overall  level. Cronbach’s  for the interpersonal social 
norm understanding items was .70 and .80 for the intrapersonal social norm understanding 
subtest. No subtest items were greater than the overall  level. 
 
Comparison of ESCoT with demographic variables in ABI patients. 
Correlational analyses between the ESCoT subtests and age, gender, SES and years of 
education yielded only one significant negative correlation between SES and the ESCoT 
affective component where the lower a patient’s SES, the poorer their performance on affective 
ToM  (r = -.32, p = .04, see Table 6). No other correlations were significant. 
 
- Insert Table 6 around here - 
 
Comparison of ESCoT with background neuropsychological assessments in ABI patients 
The correlational analyses between ESCoT performance and the background measures 
are presented in Table 6. Pearson’s correlational analyses revealed that TOPF IQ positively 
correlated with the ESCoT affective subcomponent (r = .39, p = .01), where the higher the 
TOPF IQ, the better the affective ToM performance. However, TOPF IQ did not correlate with 
the other ESCoT subcomponents. The ESCoT affective scores also positively correlated with 
general cognitive ability (RBANS total score: r = .38; p = .02), working memory (WAIS-WMI: 
r = .37; p = .02) and D-KEFS Category Fluency scores (r = .34; p = .04). Again, the higher the 
score, the better the affective ToM performance. Spearman’s correlational analyses 
demonstrated a significant positive correlation between ESCoT affective scores and D-KEFS 
Letter Fluency (rho = .38; p = .02), where the more words generated, the better the affective 
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ToM performance, and negatively with D-KEFS TMT (rho = -.41; p = .01), where the faster 
the D-KEFS TMT performance, the better the affective ToM performance. Spearman’s 
correlational analysis also showed a significant negative relationship between ESCoT 
cognitive scores and D-KEFS TMT (rho = -.32; p = .05), where the faster the D-KEFS TMT 
performance, the better the cognitive ToM performance. The ESCoT total score also negatively 
correlated with D-KEFS TMT (rho = -.39; p = .02), where the faster the D-KEFS TMT 
performance, the better the overall ESCoT performance. 
 
Comparison of ESCoT with traditional social cognition measures in ABI patients 
 Correlational analyses were conducted between performance on the ESCoT and the FP, 
RME and SNQ (see Table 6). ESCoT total scores significantly correlated with the FP (r = .34; 
p = .03), RME (rho = .33; p = .03) and SNQ tests (rho = .36; p = .02). The better the ESCoT 
performance, the better the performance on the other social cognition measures. ESCoT 
affective ToM also significantly positively correlated with the FP test (r = .37; p = .02), RME 
(rho = .52; p = .001) and SNQ (rho = .52; p < .0001). Again, better affective ToM performance 
was associated with better performance on the traditional social cognition measures. Finally, 
interpersonal social norm understanding was significantly correlated with FP performance (r = 
.39; p = .01). No other correlations were significant.  
 
Relationship between social cognition tests and background measures 
 Table 7 provides the regression analyses involving the social cognition tests and 
background measures. For ESCoT total score, performance was associated with D-KEFS TMT, 
with higher social cognition associated with faster switching. For the FP test, there was a 
relationship with working memory where those with higher FP scores showed higher working 
memory. For RME, higher TOPF IQ and faster switching were associated with better RME 
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scores. Finally, SNQ performance was significantly associated with D-KEFS TMT where those 
with higher SNQ scores had faster switching. 
 




Changes in social behaviour are common and negative consequences of brain injury (Williams 
& Wood, 2010). However, few clinicians include measures of social cognition when 
completing a neuropsychological assessment (Kelly et al., 2017), despite evidence that patients 
with a brain injury are known to experience moderate to severe ToM deficits (Martín-
Rodríguez & León-Carrión, 2010). We demonstrated that an ABI diagnosis was significantly 
associated with poorer performance on all ESCoT subtests. We also demonstrated good 
internal consistency of ESCoT items and validity of the ESCoT against established social 
cognition measures. The ESCoT was most effective at distinguishing between ABI patients 
and healthy controls, followed by the RME and SNQ. While cut-off scores derived from 
normative data are not available for the other social cognition tests, the ESCoT had 95% 
sensitivity and 88% specificity, which is higher sensitivity than the GeSoc (62% sensitivity and 
94% specificity). This highlights the ESCoT’s ability to detect social cognition difficulties that 
could go undetected using traditional social cognition measures.  
 
The ESCoT total and its subcomponents, mainly affective ToM and interpersonal social 
norm understanding, showed significant associations with well-known and validated social 
cognition measures, providing evidence of the ESCoT’s convergent validity as a social 
cognition test. In particular, ESCoT total and the affective ToM subtest correlated with the FP, 
RME and SNQ. Likewise, in autistic adults, we found that ESCoT total performance 
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significantly correlated with the RME and SNQ (Baksh et al., 2020b). However, with autistic 
adults, it was cognitive rather than affective ToM that positively correlated with the RME. 
These findings add to the debate about what the RME assesses; our current findings support 
those studies that suggest that the RME is an affective ToM measure (Duval, Piolino, Bejanin, 
Eustache, & Desgranges, 2011), at least in ABI patients. Though traditionally thought to tap 
mainly cognitive ToM, Henry and colleagues (2015) suggest the FP is both an affective and 
cognitive ToM test, and thus our results above would support this hypothesis. While 
interpersonal social norm understanding also significantly correlated with the FP test, cognitive 
ToM and intrapersonal social norm understanding did not correlate with any social cognition 
measure. It is therefore possible that some ESCoT components measure an additional 
dimension of social cognition (e.g., one’s ability to say how they may behave in certain 
situations) that traditional social cognition measures do not tap.  
 
Neither age, gender, HADS scores, SES nor years of education predicted ESCoT total 
scores, although it should be noted that our lowest level of education was 9 years. We therefore 
cannot rule out an impact of education of having lower levels of education. Regression results 
showed that better overall performance on the ESCoT was predicted by better D-KEFS TMT 
scores. In contrast, in healthy older adults, we found that TMT performance did not predict 
performance on any ESCoT measure (Baksh et al., 2020). In an ABI population who have 
executive dysfunction and/or social cognition impairment, a relationship may possibly be 
evident because one function is supporting the other damaged system. However, recent studies 
have shown that successful performance on the TMT Part-B involves both frontal and 
nonfrontal regions (Chan et al., 2015; Jacobson, Blanchard, Connolly, Cannon, & Garavan, 
2011) and task performance most likely depends upon several cognitive processes rather than 
simply executive processes. Therefore, the relationship between ESCoT performance and D-
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KEFS TMT in our ABI patients might reflect general cognitive impairment rather than an 
executive impairment. Moreover, as three of the four social cognition tests (i.e., the ESCoT, 
the RME and the SNQ) correlated with the TMT, the common variance among these tests may 
be due to general cognitive or executive ability rather than social cognition. It was also a little 
surprising that the correlations between general cognitive and executive abilities and social 
cognition were stronger for affective ToM than cognitive ToM. Further work should examine 
the underlying cause of the relationship between these tests in people with ABI and establish 
whether our findings also extend to other alternate switching tasks. 
 
Our results support the notion that ToM is a multidimensional construct where two 
separate systems are involved in processing judgements about others’ beliefs and intentions 
and judgements about other people’s emotions and feelings (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2006; 
Shamay-Tsoory, & Aharon-Peretz, 2007). However, previous work would suggest that damage 
to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex overlaps with impairment in cognitive rather than affective 
ToM and executive abilities. Several of our ABI patients are likely to have diffuse rather than 
focal brain damage, affecting a number of cortical areas, as well as their white matter 
connections so our current findings may depend on the brain areas involved. However, our ABI 
sample were recruited as part of a clinical rehabilitation service so clinical scan data were not 
available to investigate the focal damage of our ABI group.  
 
Higher working memory scores predicted better FP performance. This is not surprising 
given that complex ToM tasks possibly involve other cognitive functions, such as executive 
ability, attention, speed of information processing, and memory (Bibby & McDonald, 2005; 
Henry et al., 2006). Li et al. (2012) found that inhibition, updating, speed processing and 
memory mediated age differences on the FP task. Our current findings suggest that there is a 
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relationship between working memory and ToM in ABI, at least in terms of FP performance. 
Within our social cognition battery, the FP was the only measure where the stimuli were read 
aloud to patients. Therefore, the FP task may place additional demands on working memory as 
patients are required to remember the events of a verbal story. These findings highlight the 
importance of the modality of social cognition measures (Henry et al., 2013), especially in 
clinical populations.  
 
We also found that premorbid estimation of ability using a single-word reading task, 
the TOPF IQ, predicted RME performance. This suggests that verbal ability predicts 
performance on certain social cognition tests. Indeed, previous findings, including our own, 
have found that verbal ability predicts performance on traditional social cognition tests (Baker 
et al., 2014; Baksh et al., 2018, 2020b; McDonald et al., 2003). A similar result, however, has 
not been found for the ESCoT.  
 
Importantly, a significant proportion of our sample scored within the average range on 
the cognitive indices such as the RBANS and the executive tasks and yet failed the ESCoT. 
This highlights the need for assessing social cognition in ABI and including social cognitive 
assessments such as the ESCoT in clinical settings where decisions regarding risk, capacity, 
community living, among many others, may be required. Overall, the results showed that 
patients who showed a better understanding of others’ thoughts and social rules also performed 
better on cognitive flexibility tasks.  
 
This is the first study to examine affective and cognitive ToM as well as the 
interpersonal and intrapersonal understanding of social norms in an ABI population. However, 
our study has some limitations. The sample size and heterogeneity of the ABI sample mean 
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that the results should be interpreted with caution and different aetiologies could not be 
investigated systematically. The original sample size calculation was based on a conservative 
correlation of 0.30 (Cohen, 1992); however, correlations between social cognition and ESCoT 
measures were substantially higher than this, suggesting that our study had sufficient power to 
detect correlations of the level obtained. Future work should include a larger ABI sample to 
allow for a systematic investigation of different aetiologies and their performance on the 
ESCoT. Another possible limitation of our study is that it does not assess emotion recognition, 
and as such, other social cognition tests would need to be included in the assessment in order 
to assess the entirety of social cognition abilities.  
 
In conclusion, the ESCoT appears to be a clinically useful tool to provide clinicians 
with relevant information about ABI individuals’ appraisal of social situations and interaction 
with others. The ESCoT was the most effective social cognitive test at distinguishing between 
ABI and healthy controls. Inclusion of a social cognition measure in day-to-day clinical 
practice and assessment will improve clinicians’ ability to support individuals in the 
community and target their rehabilitation plans.  
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Table 1. Performance of the ABI patients on the premorbid ability, general cognitive ability, 
executive function and working memory measures 
 Mean Median SD Range 
TOPF IQ 102.82 104 11.28 79-125 
RBANS Total Index 82.77 83 17.04 50-119 
WAIS-IV Working Memory Index 94.56 97 16.50 66-145 
D-KEFS Letter Fluency 26.41 22 12.99 5-69 
D-KEFS Category Fluency 30.82 33 10.18 7-53 
D-KEFS Trail Making 4 (seconds) 184.26 143 110.21 40-528 
Note. TOPF = Test of Premorbid Functioning; RBANS = Repeatable Battery for Assessment 
of Neuropsychological Status; WAIS-IV = Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale 4th Edition; D-
KEFS = Delis Kaplan Executive Functioning Scale; SD = Standard Deviation. Raw Scores are 
presented for Fluency Tests. 
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Table 2. ABI and control group performance on the social cognition tests 
 
ABI patients (n = 41) Healthy controls (n = 41) 
Test (Max. Score) Mean (SD) Min – Max Mean (SD) Min – Max 
Affective ToM (30) 18.63 (5.35) 2 – 30 24.22 (3.68) 17 – 30 
Cognitive ToM (30) 14.59 (5.07) 3 – 28 21.39 (2.80) 16 – 26 
Interpersonal social norms (30) 13.90 (3.79) 8 – 25 22.37 (3.40) 15 – 28 
Intrapersonal social norms (30) 15.34 (4.34) 10 – 28 26.27 (2.07) 21 – 30 
ESCoT total score (120) 62.46 (13.82) 38 – 107 94.24 (7.18) 79 – 109 
FP test (1) 0.76 (0.77) 0.51-0.95 - - 
RME (36) 20.76 (6.14) 9 – 33 26.95 (3.51) 18 – 33 
SNQ (22) 17.90 (3.28) 7 – 22 19.10 (1.71)a 14 – 22 
Note. ToM = Theory of Mind; ESCoT = Edinburgh Social Cognition test; FP = Faux Pas test; 
RME = Reading the Mind in the Eyes test; SNQ = Social Norm Questionnaire; a Control n = 
40 
  




Table 3. Summary of multiple regression analyses for the social cognition tests with diagnosis 






Adjusted for age, sex, years of education 
Affective ToM -0.42  -0.82 –  -0.16 < 0.0001 
Cognitive ToM -0.78 -1.26 – -0.41 < 0.0001 
Interpersonal social norms -1.03 -1.45 – -0.67 < 0.0001 
Intrapersonal social norms -1.52 -2.00 – -1.10 < 0.0001 
ESCoT total score -3.37 -4.56 – -2.35 < 0.0001 
RME -0.47 -0.88 – -0.19 < 0.0001 
SNQ -0.03 -0.10 – 0.006 0.053 
Note. ToM = Theory of Mind; ESCoT = Edinburgh Social Cognition test; RME = Reading the 
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Table 4. Impairment rate comparisons between groups based on Baksh et al. (2020) cut-off 
scores 









Total ESCoT ( 83) 39/41 95.12% 5/41 12.20% 
Affective ToM ( 19) 24/41 58.54% 5/41 12.20% 
Cognitive ToM ( 17) 31/41 75.61% 4/41 9.76% 
Interpersonal social norms ( 18) 36/41 87.80% 7/41 17.07% 
Intrapersonal social norms ( 22) 38/41 92.68% 1/41 2.44% 
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Table 5. ESCoT performance by ABI diagnosis 
 
Note. CAV= Cerebrovascular Accident, TBI= Traumatic Brain Injury, HBI= Hypoxic Brain Injury, BT= Brain Tumour, IBI= Inflammatory 









 ESCoT affective ToM 
( 19) 
ESCoT cognitive ToM 
( 17) 
ESCoT interpersonal social 
norms 
( 18) 





 M SD Range N 
impaired 
M SD Range N 
impaired 
M SD Range N 
impaired 
M SD Range N 
impaired 




17.7 4.3 10-28 12 13.8 4.5 3-24 15 13.15 3.6 10-22 16 14 3.2 10-21 20 58.7 10.7 38-77 19 
TBI 
(n=12) 
20.08 5.1 7-26 4 15 5.2 7-23 8 13.9 3.8 8-20 11 16.3 5.03 12-28 10 65.3 14 39-88 10 
HBI 
(n=4) 
14.5 8.4 2-20 2 11.8 5.4 4-16 4 13.3 2.3 11-16 4 17.3 5.4 11-24 4 56.8 11.6 41-66 4 
BT 
(n=3) 





17 8.4 16-18 2 16 1.4 15-17 1 14.5 1.1 13-16 2 15 5.7 11-19 2 62.5 10.6 55-70 2 
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Table 6. Correlational analyses between performance on the measures of social cognition and demographics and background cognitive variables 
 














































Note. SES = socio-economic status; HADS-A= Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale Anxiety Subscale; HADS-D= Hospital Anxiety and 
Depression Scale Depression Subscale; TOPF = Test of Premorbid Functioning; RBANS= Repeatable Battery for the Assessment of 
Neuropsychological Status; D-KEFS= Delis Kaplan Executive Functioning Scale; TMT= Trail Making Test; WAIS-WM= Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale 4th Ed. Working Memory Index; FP = Faux Pas test; RME = Reading the Mind in the Eyes test; SNQ = Social Norms 
Questionnaire; ToM= Theory of Mind; ESCoT = Edinburgh Social Cognition Test; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; a = Spearman’s correlations.  
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Table 5. Summary of multiple regression analyses for the social cognition tests and background measures 
 ESCoT total score FP test RME SNQ 
Model 1  - - R2 = 0.23, F(1, 38) = 
11.13, p < 0.005 
 
TOPF IQ (β = 0.48, SE = 
0.08, p < 0.005) 
R2 = 0.12, F(1, 38) = 4.98, 
p < 0.05 
 
TOPF IQ (β = 0.34, SE = 




R2 = 0.11, F(1, 38) = 4.51, 
p < 0.05 
 
D-KEFS TMT (β = -0.33, 
SE = 0.02, p < 0.05) 
 
R2 = 0.14, F(1, 38) = 6.11, 
p < 0.05 
 
Working memory (β =  
0.38, SE = 0.00, p < 0.05) 
 
R2 = 0.45, F(2, 38) = 
14.47, p < 0.0001 
 
F–change = 13.92, p < 
0.001, ΔR² = 0.22 
 
TOPF IQ (β = 0.37, SE = 
0.07, p < 0.01), D-KEFS 
TMT (β = -0.48, SE = 
0.01, p < 0.01) 
 
R2 = 0.24, F(2, 38) = 5.75, 
p < 0.05 
 
F–change = 5.87, p < 0.05, 
ΔR² = 0.12 
 
TOPF IQ (β = 0.26, SE = 
0.04, p = 0.09), D-KEFS 
TMT (β = -0.36, SE = 
0.01, p < 0.05) 
Note. ESCoT = Edinburgh Social Cognition Test; FP = Faux Pas test; RME = Reading the Mind in the Eyes test; SNQ = Social Norms 
Questionnaire
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. The percentage of ABI patients in each performance classification across the 
premorbid ability, general cognitive ability, and executive function measures. 
Figure 2. ROC curves for the Edinburgh Social Cognition Test (ESCoT), the Reading the Mind 
in the Eyes (RME) test and the Social Norm Questionnaire (SNQ) 
  





















RBANS Total (N=41) WAIS-WM (N=41) DKEFS Letter Fluency (N=39)
DKEFS Category Fluency (N=39) DKEFS TMT 4 (N=39)
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